How Are Semantic Metarepresentations Built and Processed? Manuel Bremer 1 Abstract2 This paper looks at some aspects of semantic metarepresentation.3 It is mostly concerned with questions more formal, concerning4 the representation format in semantic metarepresentations, and5 the way they are processed.6 Section 1 distinguishes between metacognition and metarepresen-7 tation in a narrow and broad sense. Section 2 reminds the reader8 of some main areas where metarepresentations have to be used.9 The main part considers the ways that metarepresentations are10 built and processed. Section 3 introduces some general ideas how11 semantic metarepresentations are built and processed. Section 412 looks at some recent theories about ways that semantic metarep-13 resentations are built and processed.14 1 Introduction15 In psychology metacognition is described in its function and in a way16 that corresponds to ways it can be tested and measured (cf. [9]). Psy-17 chology here works with the concept of metacognition in its bare sense of18 a cognition being the object of an other cognition. Some theories propose19 models of control ow and access between cognitive faculties (like long20 term memory and linguistic reports on stored information) or `les' of21 stored information and ongoing cognitive processes. These processes as22 cognitive processes need not be conscious, but as testing relies on linguis-23 tic reports or some form of explicit judgement (e.g. by making a mark24 on a condence level scale) conscious forms of metacognition or at least25 the conscious states correlated with metacognitive states (like feelings26 of knowledge) are in the foreground of laboratory tested psychological27 models.28 Kriterion  Journal of Philosophy (2012) 26: 117. http://www.kriterion.at c© 2012 The author 2 Kriterion  Journal of Philosophy (2012) 26: 117 What, peculiarly, is missing in these theories and observations are29 ne-grained models of the format(s) and representational structure(s)30 of these meta-cognitions. Do we deal here with a linguistic/verbal in-31 terpretation of feelings of security (of knowledge, say)? Or do we deal32 here with a language of thought-representation in the scope of another33 language of thought-representation, which by the usual mechanisms of34 belief report then becomes verbalized? Or something else altogether. . .35 Apart from the representational structure one may wonder about36 the access mechanisms involved in these forms of meta-cognition. Are37 memory-stores accessed? And if so, to what depth? Might there be a38 relation between depth of search (in a le or store) and the condence39 judgement concerning the obtained result?40 Ultimately the observations like condence judgements being inu-41 enced by frequency of presentation of material (notwithstanding proper42 temporal order, as in witness accounts) should have an explanation in43 terms of a model of arriving at such judgements by a control ow ac-44 cessing dierent (memory) stores and faculties.45 A meta-representation in the narrow sense is a representation the46 content of which contains another representation. Quotations, codings47 (like Gödel-numberings) or higher order beliefs are taken to be typical48 examples.49 Representations concerning our cognitive (representational) faculties50 may be taken as meta-representations in a broader sense. They do not51 contain individual other representations, but their content contains or52 refers to representational properties (i.e. either properties of individual53 representations in their function as representations or properties of some54 faculty inasmuch as they are invoked in the explanation of its represen-55 tational function). A justication of a claim may invoke other represen-56 tations or may invoke beliefs about the proper workings of claims of this57 type (e.g. beliefs about the reliability of observation). In this case the58 justication is metarepresentational in the broader sense.59 A study of meta-representation belongs in part to the study of cog-60 nition (cognitive science) or the study of the mind in the narrow sense of61 exploring how the mind works and where in its workings metarepresenta-62 tions occur, and how they function. A study of metarepresentation also63 belongs to epistemology, and thus the theory of cognition is a broader64 sense, in as much as meta-representations have a role to play in justi-65 cation, a theory of justication thus containing a part that deals with66 the role and function of metarepresentations.67 Manuel Bremer: Semantic Metarepresentations 3 2 Why Are Meta-Representations Built?68 In the cognitive sciences metarepresentations are investigated from sev-69 eral ankles. Theories invoking a crucial role for metarepresentations70 range from higher order theories of consciousness, theories of self-monitor-71 ing, theories of attitude attribution to (pragmatic) theories of commu-72 nication and implicatures. An impression of the breadth of studies can73 be gained from the collection Metarepresentation ([18]). Even in the74 wider public theories of folk psychology as (innate) `theory of mind' and75 studies on the metacognitive abilities of animals have received wide in-76 terest. I will focus here instead on two areas which are closely related to77 semantics and to our concern of the structure of metarepresentations.78 One area in which metarepresentations are crucial are theories of jus-79 tication, especially coherence theories of justication. Judgements of80 coherence (of one belief/statement cohering with others) are metarepre-81 sentational. Coherence theories, thus, often work with the idea of the82 reasonser accessing the belief systems and being able to (meta-)represent83 beliefs. Laurence BonJour ([3]) calls this `the Doxastic Presumption':84 the believer `must somehow have an adequate grasp of the total system85 of beliefs, since it is coherence with the system which is at issue.' (p.86 102). The `grasp' consists in `metabeliefs' (operating mostly as presump-87 tions that justicatory beliefs are in store). Keith Lehrer's subjective88 coherentism (cf. [15]) is another theory involving metarepresentation of89 this kind: `evaluation or certication of incoming information is a meta-90 mental activity. The mind that certies incoming information is a kind91 of metamind' (p. 252).92 Theories of belief update and justicatory relations are linked to se-93 mantic theories, as the question which information or newly believed94 sentence aects which other information or sentences is related to the95 meaning and content of the sentences in question. In semantics itself the96 question of metarepresentation arises in several connections.97 Speakers of natural language come by with limited expertise on em-98 ploying terms like beech or lime (tree) facing a tree. Linguistic di-99 vision of labour allows that we defer to the experts. In this case we100 employ a term with the knowledge that this very term has appropriate101 conditions of usage and proper reference, only we do not (exactly) know102 which. This linguistic knowledge again is metarepresentational because103 it has to quote the term it is knowledge about. If I know `The term104 beech refers to a tree identiable by botanic experts' I have a metarep-105 resentation concerning the lexical item beech.106 Speakers also have to have some accessible, though often sub-doxastic-107 4 Kriterion  Journal of Philosophy (2012) 26: 117 ally used, knowledge of the semantic rules of their language. Updating108 one's description of the world in case of conicting data or expectations109 includes metarepresentations concerning proper usage. To rehearse the110 basic idea: According to the model of radical translation (cf. [8]): We111 translate the statements of L1 into statements of L2 which give the truth112 conditions for L1. To do this we look at the linguistic behaviour of the113 speakers of L1. An interpreter proceeds by correlating the statements114 to be interpreted with the situational conditions he perceives (i.e. with115 his perceptions and not with his physiological states). The reference116 to situations of justied usage (where the truth conditions of some L1117 statement are met) enables the interpreter to formulate an interpretation118 axiom leading to (T )-equivalences in the truth/meaning theory for that119 language. To accomplish this the interpreter incorporates normative as-120 sumptions with regard to the L1-speakers. To start with we transfer our121 logic to L1. Secondly we have to assume awareness of propositional at-122 titudes. For something to be a reason the reasoner must be aware of it,123 or at least he could bring it to his awareness. We interpret by assuming124 that the statements build a coherent system. Without these assumptions125 understanding would be impossible. Someone who would use expressions126 arbitrarily would make it impossible to establish a correlation between127 his manners of usage and situations in the world. If, on the other hand,128 the use of expressions builds a coherent system, then statements which129 are supposed to be true will be integrated in the belief system, and state-130 ments which turn out to be false will be taken out. To do this speakers131 have to have propositional attitudes. They believe that something is the132 case, and believe that there are connections between what they believe133 (inferential relations between statements). And they believe that there134 are rules determining how the expressions of L1 should be employed.135 For example that some new circumstances no longer allow to speak of136 an object a being F , since under the new conditions F  should not be137 employed. To judge the coherence of speaking an interpreter has to know138 what should be said in L1 under some circumstances. By this the inter-139 preter has understood the assignment of truth conditions as normative.140 One has or formulates a theory of meaning for L1 with the maxim: Use141 the expressions of L1 under exactly those conditions which are specied142 in the (T )-equivalences (or meaning postulates).143 Any theory of reading o the coding of concepts with words of some144 (natural) language by radical interpretation or some related method com-145 mits itself, therefore, to the existence, accessibility, and constitutive force146 of semantic rules in that language.147 Manuel Bremer: Semantic Metarepresentations 5 3 How Are Meta-Representations Built and Processed?148 As a point of departure let us assume some version of a representational149 theory of mind (RTM) where beliefs are understood as tokens of language150 of thought (LoT) sentences processed by some cognitive (sub-)system or151 stored in a `belief box'. A dispositional or sub-doxastic belief needs152 nothing besides that LoT-sentence. An occurring belief if it is accessi-153 ble to consciousness involves some further representation (like a natural154 language sentence verbalized in inner speech) as LoT-sentences are nei-155 ther phenomenally given nor immediately accessible as such. Even some156 sub-doxastic or dispositional beliefs may be tied to some specic way to157 express that belief (by mechanisms of memory or by limited expressive158 power of the cognitive system under discussion). If it is true that John159 dispositionally believes that the Earth is at, John may have never en-160 tertained the sentence `The Earth is at' or utter it on being asked. If it161 is true that John has an occurring belief (in inner speech) that the Earth162 is at, he has at least used some natural language sentence, synonymous163 to `The Earth is at.164 In a representational theory of mind there are several levels of mental165 processing, some of them are representational, some of them are sub-166 symbolic, some representations we are aware of, others we are not aware167 of. Functional architecture comprises levels of intentionality, levels at168 which stimuli are transduced into representations to be processed at169 some intentional level, and ultimately some physiological implementation170 level.171 Metarepresentations are vital in de dicto attitude attributions. A172 short reminder may be in place.173 Every natural language belief report has a de dicto and a de re read-174 ing in semantics or logical form, the surface sentence thus being semanti-175 cally ambiguous. The two readings dier in truth conditions. This does176 not only pertain to singular terms but to all constituents with a semantic177 role.178 (1) John believes that the gardener is at sleep.179 has a de dicto reading180 (1d) Believes(John, The gardener is at sleep)181 In the de dicto reading John stands in the BELIEVE relation to a sen-182 tence either identical or at least synonymous (identical in meaning) to183 the sentence used (not mentioned) in the that-clause.1 What we un-184 derstand as listeners to the report is understood by John.185 6 Kriterion  Journal of Philosophy (2012) 26: 117 (1) also has a de re reading, using some form of propositional/sentent-186 ial quantication (supposedly with a substitutional semantics):187 (1r) (∃p)((p ≡The gardener is at sleep)∧(Believes(John,p)))188 In the de re reading the reporter claims that John's belief has some ob-189 jective content, however John referred to that content. The sentence used190 in the report need not share its meaning with the sentence/proposition191 John believed. It only shares its referential content. De re attribution192 may concern dispositional or sub-doxastic beliefs. De dicto attributions193 presuppose that the attributee has or has had some occurent  maybe194 even consciously accessible  belief that p.195 Given (1r) not only singular terms but any part of the sentence is196 open to extensional substitution (say by some other phrase picking out197 the processes going on in the gardener when being asleep).198 The de re attribution is true i John stands in the BELIEVE relation199 to some sentence equivalent to that used in the that-clause. Thus is200 true if John tokens or stores a LoT-representation (in his `belief box')201 having the same content as the sentence used in the that-clause. The202 de re attribution, however, can also be true, because John has only the203 dispositional belief that p. The de dicto belief attribution is true i John204 has or has had an occurring belief using an introspectively given  typi-205 cally verbalized  representation with the same meaning as the sentence206 used in the that-clause. De dicto reports thus are essentially metarep-207 resentational. This need not be so for de re reports: John may have the208 dispositional believe that New York is not in the Netherlands, although209 he has never explicitly thought about it, since it is implied by some of210 his explicit beliefs about New York. As John has never had any repre-211 sentation processed equivalent to `New York is not in the Netherlands'212 one may doubt such a de re attribution to be metarepresentational. The213 person attributing the dispositional belief to John uses her own repre-214 sentational resources and need not even aim at claiming anything about215 John's representations.216 Belief attributions expressed in natural language are  one may think217 `easily'  metarepresentational by quoting another sentence or using that218 other sentence in an embedded complement clause. Our sub-doxastic219 reasoning, however, will use such attributions as well. And the natural220 language reports have to have some conceptual content. The represen-221 tation medium of these levels (the LoT) therefore has to have the means222 not only to built metarepresentations in general, but to built metarep-223 resentations which contain items of the public language.224 Manuel Bremer: Semantic Metarepresentations 7 There are several ways in which meta-linguistic representations may225 occur in the LoT:226 a) Linguistic sharing of labour may be a way to acquire a concept that-227 what-is-referred-to-by-experts-as-α, α being a structural de-228 scription (say a quote of a form in one's linguistic community). In229 this case, supposing a successful hooking up to the target extension,230 at least the mediation between the new concept (a LoT-type) and231 the referent requires meta-linguistic representation. Some time later232 that concept may be linked to a as its expression. One may then233 have forgotten who the experts are/were. One knows, nevertheless,234 that a is an established lexical item of one's language, which ex-235 presses the concept (formerly known as) that-what-is-referred-236 to-by-experts-as-α. The concept that-what-is-referred-to-237 by-experts-as-α refers to α's referent. For experts this is the refer-238 ence of the non meta-linguistic conceptA they express by α.239 b) Intensional contexts invite attributions of propositional attitudes240 which essentially point to the way the attributee represents a state241 of aairs. In such attributions one may meta-linguistically point to242 a speaker's idiolect, quoting an expression of the language to explain243 its usage by the attributee of the attitude ascription. The conceptual244 content of such an attribution thus contains a quotation or some245 other meta-linguistic device (like reference to phonetic or graphemic246 features). [see section 4.1; cf. already [14]]247 c) Rules of grammar allow for stylistic variations. Such variations may248 be the vehicles of language shift (cf. [1, pp.218223]). Such stylistic249 variations may be triggered or invited by lexical items (in the con-250 text). In this case the grammatical competence of a speaker contains251 rules which refer to other lexical items (i.e. they are meta-linguistic).252 If a LoT representation contains or quotes a lexeme (a word) of a natural253 language, how is that lexeme to be represented? Certainly the mind254 need not process a sound le or a picture of a written word at that time.255 Syntactic derivations arrive at structural descriptions. Such structural256 descriptions are pairs of representations, one to be passed to the phonetic257 component, one to be passed to the conceptual system. Each part is a258 LoT representation. The representation π to be passed to the phonetic259 component contains all phonetic features needed for Spell Out2. So260 a word or part of a phrase is represented at a LoT level as a set of261 phonetic features, each of which has some LoT representation. Thus it262 8 Kriterion  Journal of Philosophy (2012) 26: 117 is sucient for quoting a natural language word or phrase to embed its263 representation π into another LoT representation.264 One usage of natural language representations embedded in LoT-265 processing may be as labels in le semantics. File semantics works with266 the idea that our knowledge is heavily compartmentalized. One com-267 partment may contain my botanic knowledge about elm trees, another268 my knowledge about Cicero  and maybe another my knowledge about269 Tully. This solves a couple of problems: facts about the same object can270 be kept apart if they are led in dierent places; keeping relevant facts271 from interacting may be an explanation of self-deception (cf. [7]). Merg-272 ing les may be the use of informative identity statements (cf. section273 4.1).274 4 Some Recent Proposals on the Structure of Semantic Meta-275 representations276 This paragraph looks at some recent theories involving the use of metarep-277 resentations in our semantic capacities. The rst two sub-paragraphs278 discuss two theories crucially exploiting the presence of metarepresenta-279 tions. The third sub-paragraph criticizes some neglect of metarepresen-280 tation in two other theories.281 4.1 Fiengo and May on Belief Attribution and Informative Identity282 Statements283 De Lingua Belief (cf. [10]) by Robert May and Robert Fiengo uses the284 proper name problems (like substitution, co-reference. . . ) to illustrate285 their theory of meta-linguistic beliefs. Meta-linguistic beliefs are said286 to occur at the linguistic derivational level of Logical Form (and thus287 propositional content), and attributing such beliefs is said to improve288 accounting for language use (inter alia with respect to proper names).289 The two central ideas of the book are (i) a distinction between names290 and `expressions', which embed names, and (ii) an analysis of the logical291 form of some sentences which proposes meta-linguistic additional content292 (beyond presumable surface content).293 (ad i) Fiengo and May claim that names `do not refer' at all (p.14)!294 They are employed in `expressions'. An `expression' is a phrase using295 some phonological form carrying an index to distinguish it from an-296 other `expression' using the same phonological form, e.g. [Fred1] vs.297 [Fred2]. The co-indexing device can also be used to explain anaphoric298 reference (use of pronouns). Co-indexing thus does not require identity of299 Manuel Bremer: Semantic Metarepresentations 9 used phonological form. Referential knowledge consists in knowing `as-300 signments' which correlate `expressions' with their referents. If `expres-301 sions' are part of the logical form of a statement, seemingly tautological302 statements can be informative: [Paderewski1] is [Paderewski2]. And the303 logical form reveals the information in informative identity statements:304 [Cicero1] is [Tully1].305 (ad ii) Fiengo and May distinguish de dicto attributions, as these306 include a commitment to the way the described person uses expressions,307 as involving meta-linguistic content from, ordinary, de re attributions.308 For instance: Fred believes Cicero is a Roman is taken as Fred believes309 [[[Cicero1] is a Roman] and [[Cicero1] refers to Cicero]]. The last oc-310 currence of Cicero may be exchanged by any other way to pick out the311 reference of the `expression' [Cicero1], e.g. to account for Fred mistaking312 somebody else for Cicero. Further on, the failure of substitution into de313 dicto attribution can now be explained. As the `expression' is quoted in314 the second conjunct substitution would be substitution into quotation315 marks, which is forbidden.316 These main idea account for the problems in the vicinity of proper317 name semantics, but if true they substantially revise our picture of se-318 mantics (e.g. which items refer, the role of the lexicon, the theory of319 the linguistic-conceptual interface)! As names are only used in `expres-320 sions' one needs supposedly less lexical entries for the same phonological321 form, but this is no representational gain, as the authors complaining322 about the `many names of the same phonological shape' (p.146) seem323 to think, as one needs now as `many' assignment statements (for each324 possible referent of an `expression' built by using that name). These325 assignments supposedly work as semantic axioms to be used in deriving326 truth conditions in internal semantics  and so forth.327 Both main ideas invite a couple of questions. The indices which328 come with `expressions' we nd neither in verbal communication nor in329 written texts, nor in inner speech (verbal imagination). Thus `expres-330 sions' occur on some sub-doxastic cognitive level, say of processing of331 syntax somewhere in the linguistic derivational system. One may ask332 now whether what carries such indexed labels are syntactic entities or333 concepts themselves. If one adheres to some LoT hypothesis one may334 say that a speaker may have two Paderewski concepts, each of which335 labels some memory folder with corresponding beliefs. The indices dis-336 tinguish these concepts and the concepts are linked to the ambiguous337 name. If one learns about their co-referentiality the two les are merged.338 As the sub-doxastic `expressions' have to be language of thought items339 10 Kriterion  Journal of Philosophy (2012) 26: 117 themselves the only reason to introduce these additional representations340 (beyond concepts and lexical items) can be some derivational advantage341 (like better anaphoric reference). In case of an ambiguous spoken name342 the standard picture sees the ambiguity arising at the level of interpre-343 tation (assigning a concept); Fiengo and May will see the ambiguity344 arising in derivation (building a dierent `expression'). They need a new345 account of parsing/de-coding by the audience then as well. Phonological346 forms especially if mentioned in meta-linguistic beliefs have to be pro-347 cessed early in derivations now. One therefore has to reconsider basic348 derivational procedures (like Merge in Generative Grammar)  quite an349 agenda, it seems.350 The second main idea (the proposal of meta-linguistic propositional351 content) invites similar questions. A whole conjunct present in Logical352 Form does not get spelled out (is not pronounced). One needs principles353 beyond those currently used in Generative Grammar to explain what354 governs Spell Out now.355 4.2 Cappelen and LePore on Raising in Mixed Quotations356 In their recent book Language Turned On Itself (cf. [6]) Herman Cappe-357 len and Ernie LePore revise their former theory of quotation. Their new358 `Minimal Theory' centres around the principle that the basic semantic359 rule for quotation is: ` `e' ' quotes `e' (for any expression `e'). So any360 quotation which quotes a quotable item contains that very item. This361 goes against theories (including their own former theory) which analyse362 so called `mixed quotations' (like: Fred believed that `the gardener' is363 sleeping) as both quoting and using the quoted item (in this case the364 gardener). Such theories appeal to the supposedly obvious fact that365 we understand the whole belief attributed: there are no black holes in366 understanding where a quoted item occurs. The attribution supposedly367 was ungrammatical if the quoted items had not their usual grammatical368 roles (in the example: the gardener as noun phrase forcing agreement369 with the verb phrase). As these theories have many diculties  I do370 not go into here  Cappelen and LePore switch to the Minimal The-371 ory. They have to deal now, however, with our intuitive understanding372 of mixed quotes. They develop a theory of raising the quote in Logical373 Form, a theory which  apart from being about quotation  is metarepre-374 sentational. The raising rules are metarepresentational. Given a mixed375 quotation (often a belief attribution like in our the gardener example)376 the raising rules proceed as follows (cf. pp.138-41): Out of the comple-377 ment clause (`that the gardener is sleeping') the quoted item  usually378 Manuel Bremer: Semantic Metarepresentations 11 a phrase  is raised in the syntax tree to a new sister node of the com-379 plement leaving behind a trace. The semantic value of that new sister380 node is the quotable item, it is quoted as the sister node is a quota-381 tional phrase `QXP'. The trace still points to the original phrase and382 is interpreted straight forwardly; in our example: the noun phrase `the383 gardener' is raised out of the complement into a quotational phrase QNP384 which combines the functional head Q (which maps quotable items to385 their quotes) with it to yield the gardener, the trace is interpreted as386 referring to the gardener. In short: Raising to quotational phrases gen-387 erates mixed quotes, we understand the proposition in the mixed quote,388 since the trace still points to the former constituent.389 The theory nicely explains how the metarepresentation is built. It390 invokes a quotational capacity (maybe some function in the LoT) by391 which we can embed quotable items into other representations without392 losing their objective content in the compositional content of that longer393 representation. There are many reasons why we are interested in quot-394 ing. And the theory nicely accounts for features of mixed quotation like395 reexivity, which requires that in `Fred said that the gardener loves her-396 self' the quoted item c-commands the pronoun, which comes out true in397 the raising tree.398 As Fiengo and May's theory the theory employs the idea of trans-399 formations in Logical Form, and it also aects Spell Out. In distinction400 to Fiengo and May's theory the concept of `trace' (or `copy') explains401 that at the Phonological Interface only the rst occurrence is spelled402 out. Usually in Generative Grammar, however, transformations in Log-403 ical Form are considered to take place after Spell Out. Both theories404 thus have to be related to the latest development within the Minimalist405 Program, which completely rework Logical Form and Spell Out towards406 `phases' (cf. [13]).407 4.3 Patterson and Hanna on Sub-doxastic Logic and Semantics408 In Rationality and Logic (cf. [12]) Robert Hanna tries to defend and409 re-vitalize the more or the less Kantian thesis that all rational human410 beings share a faculty of logic, which is governed by normative principles.411 This faculty is protological is the sense that it is operative in construct-412 ing logical systems. It is a priori by being innate. Making use of both413 the innateness idea with respect to cognitive faculties and of the idea414 of constructing individual logical systems by an innate faculty of princi-415 ples Hanna takes up main elements of current cognitive linguistics and416 tries to combine them with ideas of the (Neo-)Kantian tradition. Just417 12 Kriterion  Journal of Philosophy (2012) 26: 117 as universal grammar is understood in generative grammar as a set of418 principles by which individual languages are learned (i.e. by specifying419 some parameters occurring in them), so Hanna conceives of the protolog-420 ical faculty. Individual logics are then a collection of separated systems421 which nevertheless share abstract common features, just as the collection422 of all human possible languages shares the common features of univer-423 sal grammar. The Kantian mentalistic talk about faculties of reason is424 transformed into the cognitive science idea of innate capacities, which425 are modules of the mind/brain. Hanna thus brings together traditional426 mentalism with mentalism in the tradition of Jerry Fodor and Noam427 Chomsky. Hanna tries to integrate the idea that humans are essentially428 rational beings with current theories of cognition and the modular mind.429 This in itself is a fruitful approach, since it either provides us with the430 opportunity to integrate traditional theories about reason into current431 theories of cognition  or, even by failing in this attempt of combination;432 it may teach us where the two approaches have to part ways without an433 option of reconciliation.434 I would like to highlight some critical aspects close to the idea of a435 logical faculty. Hanna justies the logical faculty thesis by an exten-436 sion of Chomsky's learnability arguments for natural languages and by437 a Kantian argument seeing in the logical faculty the transcendental con-438 dition for understanding any specic logical system. Both are strong439 arguments. Hanna de facto, although not explicitly so, engages in a440 on-going debate between philosophical logicians whether there is or can441 be one universal logic or whether there is irreducible logical pluralism.442 A recent statement of pluralism is Greg Restall's and JC Beall's Logi-443 cal Pluralism (cf. [17]). Their critics  and Hanna may join in here 444 argue that even if there is a plurality of systems we are able to under-445 stand them all, and we are able to argue about them. These arguments446 have to use, it seems, some common logic. Hanna does not say much447 what belongs into the protological faculty. He mentions only some basic448 principles like the concept of validity, but also the highly controversial449 principle of non-contradiction. He believes that to identify more is not450 the task of philosophers like him. Getting to work on this task, however,451 may be the cardinal way to verify the idea of a universal logical faculty.452 Logical universalists have therefore begun to work out specic systems453 that can be used either as universal logic or as fall back system while454 using more than one system.3 If there is such a universal logic (or some-455 thing like Hanna's `logic of thought') it can in at least one crucial aspect456 not be like universal grammar (or the language of thought). The prin-457 Manuel Bremer: Semantic Metarepresentations 13 ciples of universal grammar are cognitively inaccessible, at most some458 of the rules of individual natural language grammars are tacitly known459 and open to some limited cognitive access. The linguist comes up ex460 post with her theory by explaining the verbal behaviour and judgements461 on wellformedness by competent speakers (cf. [2]). This cannot be true462 with respect to principles of logic and rationality, since we not only follow463 these rules, we also represent them explicitly in processes of deliberation464 and argumentation to ourselves. Rules of logic are much more like se-465 mantic knowledge, which has to be cognitively accessible in verifying or466 rejecting statements. Hanna claims that we have a capacity of `logical467 intuition', but that stays, despite Hanna's phenomenological claims on468 feelings of `doxastic ease' and `a sense of rational guidedness' in working469 with imagined symbols, as mysterious as similar claims by logicians like470 Gödel or Brouwer. One needs rather a theory of making our tacit logical471 knowledge explicit.472 A similar criticism applies to Douglas Patterson's ([16]) theory of in-473 consistent semantics. Patterson's theory is a version of `the inconsistency474 view' (that natural language semantics is inconsistent). He combines475 the idea that the paradoxes are derivable contradictions (an idea famous476 in some quarters of paraconsistent logic) with the linguistic idea of a477 lexical module within the language faculty: `understanding a language478 can be a relation to a false semantic theory' (p. 198). Since believing479 falsehoods one knows to be false is irrational, the theory has problems480 of self-appraisal. How can anyone  Patterson included  believe a se-481 mantic theory just shown to be false? To circumvent this self-defeat482 Patterson has to endorse a modularity view of semantics: semantics is483 not just mainly implicit (sub-doxastically processed), but is a module484 in the strict Fodorian sense (cf. [11]). Our theories cannot cognitively485 penetrate the stored semantic knowledge: `understanding a natural lan-486 guage is sub-doxastically cognizing a semantic theory that the paradoxes487 show to be logically false' (p.221). As, according to Patterson, semantics488 is cognitively impenetrable, we do not engage in irrationality.4489 Nonetheless it seems unavoidable that we trust in sharing seman-490 tic knowledge with our interlocutors, semantic knowledge that we can491 appeal to if the occasion (of using rectangular or quadratic, say) de-492 mands it.493 Both theories neglect that speakers have to have some doxastic ac-494 cess to their internal semantic knowledge. A speaker has to have some495 knowledge of semantic rules, and this includes metarepresentation as one496 has to know whether in the light of conicting information a term can497 14 Kriterion  Journal of Philosophy (2012) 26: 117 still be employed (cf. section 2).498 5 Conclusion499 Notwithstanding the ubiquity of metarepresentation in human cognition500 and the growing research on metacognition, many resulting questions501 close to procedural and computational models of cognition have to be502 more thoroughly explored. Precise models of the inner workings of our503 metarepresentational faculties are scarce. They require a general account504 of quotation, and an account of general (most non-conscious) cognition505 interacting with the language faculty and the lexicon. The aim of the506 present paper was to explore in parts the general role and some spe-507 ci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